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EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA.

THESIS OF
WALTER HERBERT ALCOCK
CORNELL LAV SCHOOL
JUNE 1895.
-- - - - - - - - - - - ------

INTRODUCTI ON.

In writing upon this subject I have found the task to
be one of great difficulty,owing to the lack of proper materials,but still I have ebdeavored to do my best.
I have treated the subject in three periods of time,
1st. I made a brief historical review in general; 2nd.
I treated the subject in the colony of William Penn from
its settlement until the Declaration of Independenoe;
3rd. I have taken the subject from that date to the pros

ent time, tr~rtn

t

io;

soM-

of its

peculiarities.

ty

treatment of the subject has Ihad tc be brief as the subject has to be treated in that manner or else gone into
very minutely and carefully.

EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Before entering into a full discussion of the history of Equity in Pennsylvania, it is necessary for us to consider the meaning of tht word equity. One definition of the word equity is the one
given by Justinian in the Pandects, that is, "Eqpiity is that which
in human transactions is founded in natural justice, in honesty and
right and which properly arises exaequo et bono." This definition
is a very good one in a general way, it is the definition of justice or natural law & to the uninitiated is very likely a true definition. But to those who are accustomed to deal with the subject
in a scientific & professional manner the definition is too broad,
too general in its scope and this class has given to the word a peculiar scope and meaning.
Among the primitivc races the laws that then existed were satisfactory but as the population increased and along with it the intercourse between the tribes or nations, these laws were often found
not to apply to the subject matter for ":hich they were intended and
thus there arose a need of a new branch of the law which would be
capable of correcting these defects by recurring to the natural
principles of justice and not to a law which was intended for an entirely different state of facts.
At this point we must note a difference between equity and
dispensation. When we speak of dispensation we mean a power that
relieves us entirely from the obligations of the law while cquity

points out the Qxceptions an, adjusts the law to suit these exceptions. This differencA is shown by the definition of equity in the
modern sense, that is, "Equity is a system of jurisprudencG founded
on principles of right, justice, and morality as explained, settled
and promulgated in the docisions of equity courts. It has the capacity of growth in th

directions of its settled principles and as it

system is so floxibc, its doctrines may be extended to reach and
cover new facts anQ rolations."
Thus havin

endeavored to point out the true meaninr

of equi-

ty, it becomes necessary to trace its origin and development in order to better understand it.

The first traces we have of Equity is

the definition t'at, "Equity is a correction of the law whereby roa,
son of its universality it is deficient." This th

definition given

by Aristole and shows that the Greecks were the first to observe &
try to remedy a law which at the time of its making was wise and
just but which had become the reverse by reason of the changes in
the very nature of things and men. And thus Aristole is given the
honor of being the founder of equity because we know tha t he was
the foremost philosopher of Greece and one whose writings on religion, art, law andnatural justice remained foremost in the mind of
thi public down to the tir1

of Bacon. Besides being the tutor of

Alexander,the great, the son of Philip of Macedon, he vas able to
sow seeds of his ideas of the need of this great reform, in places

whre

they were afterwards matured and resulted in the Ost

l-

ment of what wu now know as Equitable Jurisprudence.
The Romans werr, th( next nation which developes

o

this

correction v:hich they 'orrowed from the Greecks. In the prr'ctorian
courts of Rome each case was supposed to be decided on its own merits and by the judge's discretion,

hich in the wordz of Lord Cam-

den "Is the law of tyrants, it is always different in :ifforint men
it is always unknown; it is causal, and depends upon the constitution, temper and passion. In the best it is oftentimes capricious,
in the uorst it is every vice, folly and passion to which human nature is liable," was soon found out, bocause of the corruption and
partiality caused by the increasing weoalth of Romc. So in 527 A.D.
was appointed to collect all tht, Roman laws, which was

a cormisio

done and emfcofied into three books, namedthe Code, the Pandects an
the InstitutJs. Of these the Code interests us the most becauso it
was cjposuf. of all laws, instructi:3ns to Judicial officers and of
rules of jud-oment which CorncliuF c-used the Practors to inscribe
and to adhere to in deciding a case,, on account of the corruntio-

-

part ial ity.
Now lots us examine the introduction and deuelopmont of Equity in Western Europe, espesislly Englan
our laws

1c

which ic t-e source of all

institutions. At first all cases were tried by a nat-

ional assembly or court and from the judgment of t'ls tribunal the

defeated person might appal to the king direct.

As things progres

sd the kinq soon found that he bad more than he could attend to.
So King Edgar of England made a decree that embodies one of the
first and fundamental principles of equity, namely, that no on@
should appeal to him, who could obtain justice in a law court.
After a time the king allowed the chancellor to decide appeal
for h~m, this man becoming known as the Keeper of the King's conscience. But as the population and intercourse increased and therefore disputes and litigations also increased, it was found necessary to form a supreme court known as the Curia Regis or the King's
Court of Justice, which was composed of a number of the Barons with
the Chancellor andA Chief Justice, chosen from the clergy, as the
head. But the inefficiency and ignorance of the nobles and the king
and the ambition of thc clerical chancellors, who were the learned
men of the kingdom, enabled the latter to separate themselves from
the King's Council and form a new and distinct jurisdiction. Thus
having laid the foundation and being succesfUl, they were On3ouraged to extend their jurisdiction and soon wrought an entire change
in the system of the judiciary.

This change brought atout the spec-

tacle of a kingdom being governed by two sets of laws, each entirely separate but yet both tending to the same common end, that is to
administer justice.

This new court uhich was establishodsoon de-

parted from the original idea, that the original end of equity was

to correct defects arisJ.Ig- out of the generality of a law and that
each new case

'-ould bu docicLod on its

own facts and that if

these

new rules of law were roduced to positive rules the chief and only
object of this n
But not withsta-.(

court would lbe annuled.
ing t-Lise opinionr the clergy laid down positive

rules of lawt and soon changed their court into a recognized department of the la;.

This new department rapidly increased its scope &

and power for several reasons, Ist. Becusc of the tendency of the
commonNrules to hardness and rigidity by reason of the deference
paid to prec3,A'dts;
part of thue

Znd.

Refusal of the conrnon law t3 adopt that

!au.,
.,::
which may be called the equitable as distin-

tinguished from that which is merely stticti juris; 3rd. Desire to
increasesthe dignity and importance of the office of chancollor; 4th
While in law a judgment was merely for the plaintiff or defendant,
while in

oqjuity it

is

differont for although one part,

may obtain

the verdict, still as a condition precedent to the vestinc of that
verdict,

he riey bo requirud to render some duty to the defeated par-

ty; 5th. The intervntion of Uses and Trusts and their corresponding duties created a now field for the equity cou,-t or as it became
known as th, Court of Chancery.
Thus was the con-dition and situation of the Court of Chancery
at the time wh.n th; colony of Pennslyvania was estaolishod and
therefore I will now leave Equity in England and regard its estab-

lishmnt in Pennsylvania.
After having thus seen a general scheme of'the origin of Equity let us inquire into its establishment in tho colony of Penn.
But to do this we must first note the large and discretionary powers which were given to William Penn by CharlesHI

of England

Con-

sidering the fact that Charles was not a believer in religious toleration to any great extent, it was certainly a mark of great esteem
and confidence to give Penn the power of establishing courts and
laws, and also the appointment of judicial officers, the establishment of towns and the opening of potto of entry, also the supreme
military oommand.Thus making a province supposed to be subject to
the crown of England a principality and its proprietor a Palatine
instead of Governor.
We know that these great powers were given to Penn by examining the Charter of that colony. By section6 of that charter, it was
declared that the law of England relattng to the descent and enjoyment of lands, and the succession and possession of chattels was to
be the law of the propince until altered by the people's assembly.
And in section 5 of the samu charter Penn was given the power to appoint judges and establish coutts with such powers and forms as
should seem to him most convenient. By the two foregoing sections o
the charter given to Penn it seems that the introduction and ostablishment of the chancery courts would follow as a matter of course

the introduction of the common law. But here wo find an obstacle in
the form of Penn's objection to the various and complicated forms
of pleading and defense that are a greet part of the procedure in
Equity. For Penn knew that his settlers were and would be plian men
ant that their previous occupations were not such as would fit them
to practice, lot alone preside over a court which required so many
formalities. Besides the Quakers which formed a major part of his
settlers had an unique yet old form of community government to settle disputos. The quarrels and contentions of the Friends were tried
by appeal to the meeting of their persuasion, whose decrees were on,
forcedonly by the censure and contempt of the society together with
the withholding of certain privileges.
This primitive method of government was satisfactory as long
as the Quakers were the majority, but the increase of settlers soon
caused increased litigation and in 1684 a court of mixed jurisdiction of law and equity was established, the basis of the present
mixed system. This court soon failed to give satisfaction so about
1715 laws were passed by the colonial assembly establishing a system of courts, but before this new arrangement could prove satisfactory or not, Queen Anne caused- laws to be passed in England
which abolished them. Then there eame a period of great internal
dissatisfaction and quarrels which were never settled because the
few courts left, for some reason, refused to interfere, some of the

judges resigning, others refusing to sit, while some died and their
successors were never appointed.
So whan Sir William Keith ascended the chair of governor of
the colony he found great confusion and a danger of the colony going out of existence like many others did at that time and accordingly in 1720 he suggested to the assemrbly the establishment of a
regular court of Chancery. The assembl: acceded to his request and
he then granted to the court the same power and jurisdiction that
the Chancery court in England had. But this new court was not very
succesftil in its operation and very fery cases were tried by it.
About the year 1736 the people of the colony obtainud an idea, fos-

tered by the unpopularity and overbearance of Keath's successors
that it was unjustso the people of the counties of Philadelphia,
Bucks and Chester presented a petition to the Assembly and claimed
that the court was unconstitutional as it violated section 6 of the
Charter, which providedthat no person should be obliged to answer
any complaint whatsoeverrelating to propertybefore the Governor and
Council or in any other place excepting the ordinary court of justice. The Assembly agreed with the people and disbanded thQ court,
declaring it a violation of the above section. After this wi find
in the writingsof Franklin and other men of that priodreferences
made to a bill calling for the establishment of inferior and superior courts of chancery. This bill passed a few readings but beyond

this nothing more was

ver heard-of it

anK at it

can not be found

in th, Statutes wo must draw th,i conclusion that it was defeated on
account of the antagonism of the people to it.
Things went along in about the rame manner until th,. Dk claration of Indepe

.:d._-

and th,. union of the colonies.

In

1776 accord-

ing to instructions from Congress, each state held a convention in
order to organizo the government of each stt

on a n~. and firm

basis.In some states under these conventions a cfistinct court of
Chancery was established, as in, New Yorh, iITw Jersky and Delaware.
But in Pennsylvania this plan was not adopted and only a few equity
powc7

wzre -ivun to t1ac law courts.

By secti~n 24 of the proceed-

ings of th* convenrtizn of Pennsylvaniawe find that these powers
given t-- the law courts were in

reference 1st. the perpetuation of

testimony;2nd. theobtainin. of evidence from places outside of the
state;3rd.tho car- o2 persons and property of non compot s,
other

and any

owor as may be found necessary by any future asseuibly,

pro-

vided these provisions be not inconsistont with the constitition.
The laws passed by this convention soon showed the fact that
they were passed at a time of great political excitement an(' advarsion to any form of law or government that seemdto confer any few&
exclusive powgr on any court and on account of the inaccuracies and
defects of these laws, another convention was c3Pll'd in 1790 to amend them. Among other things declared by this second c~nvxntion was

that a court of chancery, with all its powers, dutics and prerogatives was in the future to be a bfanch of the judiciary of the Commonwealth and further more the Chief Chancellor, besides his regular court duties, was to sit as the presiding officer of the Senate
in all cases of impeaohments. Thus the court of chancery in Pennsyl
vania may be said to date from 1790.
Among the reasons advanced against the establishment of a sep
arate equity court in the early history of Pennsylvania was the evil effects of having two distinct courts whose powers were thought
to conflict, this seems but a weak argrument and shows the fact that
the settlers wave not acquainted with the foundation maxim of equity, that Equity will not interfere to grant relief where a remedy
exists at law. In other words a court of chancery only begins to exercise its jurisdiction where the jurisdiction of a law court ends.
Anothur barrier was found in the two conflicting sections of the
Charter. For while the 5th. section gives to the Assembly the power
to vest equity powers in such courts as may be found becessary, the
9th. section limits this power by saying "that the trial by jury
shall be as heretofore and the right thereto shall reruain inviolate.
Thus we see that while one section gives the power to confer equity
powers the other forbids or limits these Dovisrs a;' far as the doing
away with the trial by jury. And to solve this inconsistency we must
resort ti the rule of statutory construction, that where two laws

conflict and one is not directly derogatory to the other, we mast
construe them together and by one and another, so that both may
stand. And therefore in applying this method the result would seem
to be that an equity court may be established but it must recognize
the right to the trial by jury, if demanded and that the Chancellor
can not be the exclusive judge of facts as kell as of law as he is
in England.
Thus having seen the quarrels and dissentions that arose over
the establishment of a separate court of chancery, before the Revolution and during its continuance, let us now regard equity in Penn
asylvania and its development and scope from that time. Owing to my
limited means of finding out the statutes that were passed on the
subject, the greater part of the progress of thts period must be ob.
tained from the study of the cases decided in Pennsylvania on the
various parts of the subject, a tedious and rather unsatisfactory
method when not used together with a thorough study of the statutes
which is, in this case, impossible.
The first general application,in Pennsylvania,of equitable
principles was rmacde not by a separate court of chancery but by the
law courts,for in the casw of Jordan vs Cooper,3 Sergeant & Rawle
564, a case decidod about 1827,the presiding judge says the following, "In Magland from which our system of jutisprudence is derived
and in some of the states of the Union,there arw courts of lrw and

chancery possesiog separate and -Tistincr jurisdiction. Thi Courts
of Chancery mitigate the rules of law according to cquit y principle
The citizens of P:!-.-i-ylvania have been opposed to the establishment
of chancery jurisdiction distinct from the courts of law and have
required ththt in tw

zfministration of justicet e strict rules of

law should be blended with and mitigated by equitable principles.
In Pennsylvania courts of law, have to a certain extent, equity powers."From this statement we can plainly see that the law courts had
both legal and equitable jutisdiction and that the jury applied equitable principles under the direction of the court,in the same man
nar as legal ones. And that the remedy on a motion for a new trial
is the same, wasshown in the case in 15 Sargeant & Rawle 118. And
in general the courts of Pennsylvania so mould their bommon law actions as to administer equitable relief where not restrained by
form of law. That is where ever it could be done without flagrarent
ly violating some rules of common law. Thest cormon law rules were
modified and had their sharp and unyielding edges taken off, sa as
not to be too oppressive in certain cases.
Thus in this uncertain and unsatisfaction manner the courts
of Pennsylvania administered relief in many cases according to the
principles of equity. But the need of a mor4 stable and definite ju
risdiction of equity was recognized and accordingly a committee was
appointed to revise the civil code and this cormitte advised the iw

conferring of 'mlarged equity powers on the gourts. This idea was
carried out in the followaing year, and statutes were passed conferring definite powers on thy. Courts of Common Pleas and on the Supreme Courts.
Th
16th.183

statutes thus :ass ,d are as follows'- The statute of June
conferrod on the several courts of the Cormon Pleas the

powers a:nd jurisdiction of a

curt of chancery so far as relates to

l.The perpetuation of testimony;2.Tho obtaining of evidence from
places not within the state;3.ThQ care of persons and estates of
those who are non compos mentis;4.Thc control, removal and dischargE
of trustees and the appointment of trustees and the settlement of
their accounts; 5.The supervision and cohtrol of all other corporations other than those of a municipal character a-d unincorporated
societies and partnerships; 6. the care of trust moneys and properties and other moneys and properties made liable to the control of
said courts,and in such other cas-s as the said courts have hereto
fore possed such jurisdiction and powers under the Constitution and
By laws of this Commonwealth.
Th! above statute referred to the said courts in the state at
large but the courts of- PhilaCelphia ;erc given additional powers
and jurisdiction. Another part of the sami- statute gavC to the
courts of Common Pleas of the said city the powers above mentioned
besids,

1.Supervision and control of partnerships and corporations

other than imuniaipal corporations; 2.Care of trust moneys and properties and other moneys and properttes made liable to the control
of said courts; 3.Discovery of facts material to the just determination of i.-u'

anui other questions arising or depending in the

said courts; 4.The determination of rights to property or money
claimed by two or more persons, in the hands or possession of a penson claiming no right of proparty.' therein; 5.The prevention or restuaint of the cozyaission or continuance of acts contrary to law &
prejudical to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals; 6.Th

affording of specific relief where a recovery in dam-

ages would bu an inadaquate relitf.
The acts of 13 June 1840, gave to the courts of Common Pleas
in the city and county of Philadelphia, jurisdiction on ground of
fraud, mistaXe,accident or account. The scope of this act was further broadend by the act of 16 April 1845,which extended the above
jurisdiction to all cases of fraud whether the fraud be actual or
constructive. In 1848, by an act passed on the 10 of April of that
year, the same courts were giventhe powers and jurisdiction of chan
cery courts in all suits where a Bill of Discovery was sought. The
act passed June 16th. 183C which gave to the Common Pleas courts
the power of perpetuation of test!mony and the lile did not extend
to where lost records wer, desired to be perpetuated but an act
passed April 2th.1850, remedied the defect by granting that power

to the courts.
Thus vi

see that the Common Pleas Courts of Philadelphia had

greater powers and jurisdiction long before any of the other courts
scattered through the state. But on Feb. 14th. 1857, an act was pas
sod which gave to all the Common Pleas courts in the state the sane
powers and jurisdiction as the Philadelphia courts had previously
exercised. I have given these few acts to show about what the extent of the powers and jurisdiction of the courts of Pennsylvania
was, after the attempt to create a regular equity court. Of course
scattered through the various years up to 1874, a few additional
powers were granted to them but these powers were more ot less inci
dental and explanatory to the exercise of those previously given.
In 1874, when a new constitution was adopted, the Supreme
Court among other jurisdictions, was given jurisdiction in cases of
injunctions where a corporation was a party defendant. It was also
given appelate jurisdiction by appeal of certiorari or writ of error, in all cases as is now or may be provided for.Thus we see that
it has about the same jurisdiction in equity as the lower courts
with the addition of an injunction, where a corporation is a party
defendant. This constitution provided for the courts of Common Plea
by saying,that they were to continue as they were established at
that date, 1874, unless they were otherwise directed or changed by
law.

Now after having shown the general powers and jurisdiction of
the courts of Pennsylvania, I will endeavor to point out A few peculiarities of their l;i.3lati.n

as compared to the legislation in

otherstates on equity questions.
Of course the main and fundamental basis or precepts of equity are the same as in any other state, that is to saythe so called
maxims of equity are recognized and enforced the same as in any oth
er state, so I will not dwell on them at all.
Let us now proceed to the main division or topic of equity,
that is the doctrine of trusts. As a general rule we may say that
the word trust has the same significance as in any other state and
the same general rules are laid down to govern their establishment
and control. Previous to 1856, an express trust could bo created by
parole but at act passed on the 22nd. of Apr. of that year, prohibi
ted such trusts. It is also a general rule that where a trust is
created tc give effect to a well defined purpose, the courts must
sustain the trust whether the cestui quo trust be sui juris or not.
The mode of creating trusts by the use of precatory words has
caused a great deal of trouble in Pennsylvania. At firdt that method of creating estates was denied, although it was admitted that
the custome existed in England and some of tho

othor states. They

admitted that there wasat first,a reason for such practice in England and else where but they contended that th: rcason had died a-

way in this country, although the practtce was still retained. A
case holding the above was decided in 1855,

see "In the matter of

Penrock's Estate" 20 Pa.St. 268. But the English doctrine was recog
nized in the case of Burt vs Herro 10 P.F.Sraith 400, but that case
seemed to indicate that such a method of creating an estate will on
ly be recognized where an unqualfied estate is made and the matter
is not left to the pleasure and inclination of the trustee.
Another peculiar feature to be noticedis, that although the
Statute of Elizabeth introducing the Cy Pres doctrine was said to
be adopted with the other laws of England,still the courts at first
in the cast of Witman vs Lex 17 Sergeant & Rawle 88, rejected the
doctrine. But in the latter cases of City of Phila. vs Girard's
Heirs 9 Wright 21,the doctrine was introduced t; a limited extent.
It is a general rule that the interest of a cestui que trust,
what ever it may be, is liable for his debts and it can not be fenced in by limitations, so.as to secure ts it thc inconsistent characteristics of right and enjoyment to the beheficiary and immity
from his creditors. But in Pennsylvania, it is now firmly establish
ed by many authorities, that where a gift is made for lifecoupled
with a proviso exerapting the estato of the cestui que trust from
liability for his debts and where he is excluded from the control
of his property, such proviso will be good without any limitations
over upon insolvency. This end may be had not only by exemptions

from the cestui que trust's dets

but als3 that the income shall

only be spent for the benefit of the cestui que trust to the extent
which the trustee may in his discretion deem advisable for to subject thtc income so bequeathed to the execttio: of creditors would
end the discretion of the trustee and defeat thie end of th, testator expressed in the trust instrument.
Another peculiarity of the lcgislation of Pennsylvania, was
the attitude of that state to trusts created for the favor of fere
covert. The courts declared that such a women had no power over her
separate estate except thode given to hor by the trust deed and
those powers had to be strictly followed.
The rules as to the duties of trustees and their conduct are
the same as in any other state, except a trustee is not allowed to
invest trust funds in bank stock or in stock of any public corporations. In this respect the state follo.:c the rule adpoted by New
york and England.
The state doparted from the harsh rule of England and the Uni
ted States, tha; all the purchase money on a property had to be
paid at once or else there was no protection for the vendee, not even if the greater part of such money had been paid, and formulated
the rule that a payment of part of purchase money was a protection
pro tanto. The state also rejects the English rule that a deposit
of the title deeds is a good mortgage. But it holds that open and
notorious possession is sufficient notice of unrecorded deeds.

In regards to specific performance not much in to be saidexcept that the Pennsylvania courts use, vory frequently, a comnaon
law action of e@ectment as a means of compelling a vendor or vendee
to fulfill an agreement. This causes the sight of an equity court
rilying on a common law form to onforc

its decrees.

Pennsylvania agrees with New York in allowJing a great lati-tude in rogards to th

admission of evidence to prove fraud and its

remedies are substantially the same as in most states.
As a general rule a chancery court's jurisdiction, in cases
of injunctions where a corporation is a party defendant, is given
to it by statute and is not regarded as inherent in it but Pennsylvania in given to its Oupreme Court original jurisdiction in such a
case, seems to intimate that it is an inherent right in courts of
chancery instead of being an acquired right.
The divisions of equity that I have not mentioned, such as,,
reformation, cancellation, etc., are about the same as in any other
state and the rules governing vary so little that I have not consid
ered it worth while to point them out. Thu main object being to
point out the main glaring differences, which at first were numerous but have now disappeared, owing to the desire and aim of the
people to have general laws through out the United States on various questions. And having accomplished my object in
factory manner I will draw this work to an end.

a very unsatis-

